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Abstract
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening
variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three.
In all treatments, efﬁcient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher wages to
workers who have invested. However, separation of workers is incomplete and wages do not converge to
equilibrium levels. In the signaling treatment, we observe signiﬁcantly more separating outcomes compared
to the screening treatment. Increasing the number of employers leads to higher wages in the signaling
sessions but not in the screening sessions.
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1. Introduction
Signaling and screening are two alternative speciﬁcations of games with asymmetric infor-
mation. Spence’s (1973, 1974) work on “market signaling” is one of the ﬁrst treatments of such
problems, and it has led to a large body of theoretical and empirical literature. In this paper, we
use Spence’s education game both in its original signaling version as well as in a setup with
screening.1 We analyze experimentally whether such an institutional change causes differences
in results, that is, we study how outcomes are affected by the order of moves of the informed and
the uninformed party.
Spencestudiesinvestmentsineducationwhichhaveno productivevalueandno intrinsicvalue
either in a labor-market context. But by choosing to invest in education, highly productive work-
ers distinguish themselves from less productive workers. Potential employers cannot observe the
ability of the workers, but they know that investing in education is cheaper for highly able work-
ers. In this setup, if the (informed) worker moves ﬁrst, education can serve as a credible signal
of unobserved productivity, and it is rewarded by the employer with a higher wage. If the (un-
informed) employer moves ﬁrst, she offers a menu of contracts, each consisting of a wage and
an education level, from which the (informed) worker chooses and thereby possibly reveals his
type (see e.g. Rasmusen, 1994). Thus, in both the signaling and the screening variant, education
is correlated with productivity and can have a sorting effect.2
In the signaling treatments of the experiment, we study whether or not signaling occurs and
which factors facilitate it. In particular,we look at a situation with one poolingand one separating
equilibrium where only the separating equilibriumsatisﬁes Cho and Kreps’ (1987) intuitive crite-
rion.3 The screening game has a unique equilibrium with full separation of types. This screening
equilibrium leads to identical wages and investments as in the separating equilibrium of the
signaling game. We study whether offered menus of wages correspond to the predictions and
whether workers self-select by their educational choice.
In the experimental literature, signaling has received considerably more attention than screen-
ing. Previous experiments on signaling games suggest that the equilibrium concept has some
explanatory power, but that reﬁnements cannot reliably predict which equilibrium players coor-
dinate on.4 Screening has not yet been studied extensively by experimentalists, so the screening
treatments are of some stand-alone interest.5 Our main focus is on the comparison of signaling
and screening in a uniﬁed experiment. Signaling and screening may not lead to the same outcome
1 In his paper on “Job market signaling” Spence (1973) formulates the problem from the point of view of the employer
who forms the expected marginal product for an individual, given the set of signals and unalterable attributes (called
“indices”) that can be observed. He states that “Potential employees therefore confront an offered wage schedule whose
arguments are signals and indices.” Although he then analyzes the signaling game, this exposition shows how closely
related the signaling and the screening game are.
2 The Spence game had an enormous inﬂuence on game theory itself as it triggered the literature on signaling games
and equilibrium reﬁnements. See e.g. Riley (1979), Cho and Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987), and Mailath et al.
(1993).
3 Note that the pooling equilibrium is unique up to beliefs off the equilibrium path.
4 Signaling experiments include Miller and Plott (1985), Cadsby et al. (1990, 1998), Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993),
Cooper et al. (1997a, 1997b), Potters and van Winden (1996), as well as Cooper and Kagel (2003, 2008). Cooper et
al. (1997b, p. 553) conclude that the “[e]xperiments have raised serious doubts about the validity of equilibrium reﬁne-
ments.”
5 Screening has been studied experimentally in other contexts by Berg et al. (1987) as well as Shapira and Venezia
(1999) and Posey and Yavas (2007). While the ﬁrst two papers ﬁnd relatively little support for the screening model, the
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in the lab because the cognitive requirements on players differ in the two games. In the signaling
game, workers move ﬁrst and have to think about how the employer will interpret their signal.
The workers’ task is much simpler in the screening game where they only have to choose the
optimal level of education given the menu of contracts. This difference manifests itself in the
multiplicity of equilibria in the signaling game and a unique equilibrium in the screening game.
In addition, we use two different competitive environments to study the interaction between
separation of types and competition. Either two or three employers bid for the worker in wage
competition à la Bertrand. Theoretically, increasing the number of employers from two to three
has no impact on the market outcome. But this may not hold empirically. Fouraker and Siegel
(1963) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) show that the Bertrand solution does predict rea-
sonably well with three or four ﬁrms but not in the duopoly case. We check whether their result
remains valid in situations with asymmetric information.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. In all treatments, efﬁcient workers (high-ability types) invest
more frequently than inefﬁcient workers (low-ability types). Employers bid higher wages when
workers invest than when they do not invest, and high-type workers earn higher payoffs than
low-type workers. These ﬁndings are in line with the separating equilibrium. However, the data
do not fully conform to the predictions of the separating equilibrium. In particular, not all high
types invest in education, and wages do not converge to equilibrium levels. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
more separating outcomes with signaling than with screening, even though it is the screening
game that has a unique equilibrium which is separating. And ﬁnally, increasing the number of
employers leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions but not in the screening sessions.
2. Theory
Inthissection,wepresentthemodelunderlyingtheexperimentsandderivethegame-theoretic
predictions. We provide the results for the model with one worker and two employers—this is
the standard textbook variant of the Spence model. We ran experimental treatments with two and
three employers, but it will be obvious that the theoretical results are not affected by adding a
third employer. We start with the predictions for the signaling treatments and then add those for
the screening variant. All proofs can be found in the working paper version (Kübler et al., 2005)
or in any textbook treatment of the Spence model (e.g., Rasmusen, 1994).
The timing of the signaling game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the worker’s ability a ∈{ 10,50} where low (a = 10) and high (a = 50)
ability are equally likely. The worker knows a, but employers do not.
2. The worker chooses an education level s ∈{ 0,1} which is observed by the employers.
3. The employers each offer a wage w(s)∈[ 0,60].
4. The employer who offered the higher wage hires the worker. If there is a tie, a fair random
draw decides which employer hires the worker.
5. Payoffs are as follows:
πworker = w −450s/a (1)
where w equals the higher of the two wage offers.
πemployer =

25+a −w, for the employer who hired the worker,
25, for the other employer. (2)222 D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236
Theworker’spayoff(1)isthewageminushiscostofeducation,whereasthehiringemployer’s
payoff (2) is a ﬂat payment plus the difference between the worker’s ability and the wage. The
non-hiring employer receives the ﬂat payment only. (We introduced this ﬁxed positive payment
since employers earn zero expected payoffs in both equilibria of the game, see below.) Note that
theworkercannotrejectthecontract.Thissimpliﬁesthegame,butdoesnotaffecttheequilibrium
outcome. The cost of education is 450/10 = 45 for the low type and 450/50 = 9f o rt h ehigh type
of the worker.
The appropriate solution concept is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, comprising a strategy
proﬁle and a system of beliefs. Prior beliefs about the worker’s type are common knowledge.
Posterior beliefs after the worker has chosen the educational level s are as follows. Let p =
Prob(a = high | s = 1) denote an employer’s belief that the worker has high ability after observ-
ing that the worker invested in education (and hence 1 − p = Prob(a = low | s = 1)). Likewise,
let q = Prob(a = high | s = 0) denote an employer’s belief that the worker has high ability after
observing that the worker did not invest in education (and hence 1−q = Prob(a = low | s = 0)).
The game above has two equilibria—a pooling and a separating equilibrium (there are no
other equilibria specifying a different equilibrium path; see the proof in Kübler et al., 2005). Let
us start with the
pooling equilibrium:
s(low) = s(high) = 0,
w(0) = w(1) = 30,
p = 0.5,q= 0.5.
(3)
In this equilibrium, both types of the worker do not invest in education, and the two employers
offer a wage equal to the expected value of the worker’s ability (0.5 · 10 + 0.5 · 50 = 30). Ac-
cordingly, (expected) payoffs are 30 for the workers and 25 for employers (the ﬁxed payment).
Note that the employers’ information set corresponding to s = 0 is on the equilibrium path and q
is dictated by Bayes’ rule and the worker’s strategy. Employers’ information set for s = 1i so f f
the equilibrium path and Bayes’ rule does not pin down the employer’s beliefs. In (3) employers
assume that workers choose s = 1h a v ehigh ability with the prior probability 0.5. While the
pooling equilibrium (3) is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it can be ruled out by applying
Cho and Kreps’ (1987) “intuitive criterion.”
Next consider the
separating equilibrium:
s(low) = 0,s ( high) = 1,
w(0) = 10,w ( 1) = 50,
p = 1,q= 0.
(4)
In this equilibrium, the low-ability worker does not invest in education whereas the high-ability
worker does. The employers condition their wage on the signal they receive. They pay a wage
which is equal to the low type’s ability in the case of no educationwhereas they pay a wage which
equals the high type’s ability after the education signal. Since both signals can be observed in
equilibrium, Bayes’ rule implies p = 1 and q = 0. In this equilibrium the low type earns proﬁt
10−0 = 10, the high type earns 50−9 = 41, and employers earn the ﬁxed payment of 25.
Note that the high type is better off in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilib-
rium (41 > 30) and vice versa for the low type (10 < 30). The ex ante expected payoff for the
worker is higher in the pooling equilibrium though (30 > 0.5·41+0.5·10 = 25.5). This differ-
ence in expected wages is equal to the welfare loss of the separating equilibrium as the expected
payoff for the employer is the same in both equilibria. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is both ex
ante payoff dominant for the worker and welfare dominant.
Now consider the screening variant. The timing of the screening game is as follows.D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236 223
1. Nature chooses the worker’s ability a ∈{ 10,50}. The worker knows a, but employers do not.
2. The employers each offer two wages, w(s)∈[ 0,60]; s ∈{ 0,1}, which are conditional on the
education decision. The worker learns the higher wage for the two contingencies. In the case
of a tie, a fair random draw decides whose wage is displayed.
3. The worker chooses an education level s ∈{ 0,1}.
4. The employer who offered the higher wage for the education level chosen by the worker
hires the worker.
5. Payoffs are as above in the signaling variant.
There is no pooling equilibrium in this game. The unique prediction of the screening game is
the separating equilibrium with wage and investment levels as described above in (4).
3. Experimental design and procedures
We compare markets where the informed workers move ﬁrst (signaling markets, henceforth
SIG) to markets where the uninformed employers are the ﬁrst movers (screening markets, labeled
SCR). As a second treatment variable, we study the effect of varying the number of employers
(two versus three). Thus, we ran four different treatments resulting from a 2 × 2 design. The
SIG2 and SCR2 sessions involved 9 subjects each whereas the SIG3 and SCR3 sessions involved
12 subjects each.
We decided to allow for many repetitions because learning is necessary in such a complex
situation. We randomly rematched subjects in every period in order to create an environment as
close as possible to a single-period interaction between subjects. We applied role switching in the
experiment,thatis,inthecourseoftheexperimentparticipantswerebothintheroleoftheworker
and in the role of the employer. This was done for two reasons. First, role switching enhances
learning. Subjects better understand the decision problem of the other players and therefore the
overall game if they play in both roles. Second, role switching emphasizes the one-shot nature
of the interaction and therefore strengthens the effects of the random matching scheme. Most
signaling experiments employ role switching in order to speed up learning, see Brandts and Holt
(1992, 1993), Cooper et al. (1997a, 1997b), Potters and van Winden (1996).
All sessions lasted for 48 rounds. In the treatments with two employers, we partitioned the
48 rounds of the experiment into six blocks consisting of eight consecutive rounds each. Within
a block of eight rounds, roles did not change. All subjects played the role of the worker for two
blocks and the role of the employer for four blocks. In principle, after being a worker for one
block, subjects took on the role of employer for two blocks. (For some subjects this pattern was
different at the beginning and at the end of the experiment.) In sessions with three employers, we
partitioned the 48 rounds of each session into eight blocks of six rounds. Here, subjects played
in the role of the worker for two blocks and in the role of the employer for six blocks each.
As before, roles did not change within blocks. The usual pattern of role switching was that, after
being a worker for one block, subjects were in the employer’s role for three blocks. The computer
screen indicated the current role of the participant throughout the experiment.
Decision making in each round of the experiment was exactly as described in the theory
section. Note that the worker received the highest wage automatically instead of letting workers
reject wage offers. That is, in our signaling experiments, the employer who submitted the highest
wage offer hired the worker (possibly after a random computer draw if there was a tie). Similarly,
inthescreeningtreatments,theworkerwashiredbytheemployerwiththehighestwagebidgiven
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feedback information: type and investment decision of the worker, wage offers of both employers
(indicating also which employer hired the worker), own proﬁts as well as the proﬁts of the other
group members of that round and own accumulated proﬁt.
Experiments were computerized (we used the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and were conducted at Royal Holloway, University of London. In total, 126
subjects participated. Instructions are reproduced in Appendix A.
We conducted three sessions for each treatment. Sessions lasted about one and a half hours.
Earningsweredenotedin“points.”Theexchangerateof£1for150pointswascommonlyknown.
Subjects received a one-off endowment of 200 points at the beginning of the experiment in order
to cover possible losses in the initial phase of the experiment. Subjects’ average earnings were
£9.40, including the initial endowment.
4. Results
4.1. Summary and general ﬁndings
We summarize the data in Table 1. For workers, Table 1 shows investment rates for each type.
For employers, it shows average wages paid (that is, the averages of the winning wage bids).
To test for signiﬁcance of differences in the data, we run regressions for the investment de-
cisions of workers, the wages paid by employers as well as proﬁts of employers and payoffs
of workers. As independent variables we use the worker’s type (high vs. low), the investment
decision of workers (yes vs. no), or treatment as a dummy.
Table 1
Average investment rates and average wages paid
Treatment Rounds Investment rate Employers’ wage paid
if worker’s type is for the case of
low high no investment investment
SIG2 All data 0.10 0.60 14.85 27.89
(0.04)( 0.08)( 0.30)( 3.35)
Last block 0.00 0.65 13.57 29.38
(0.00)( 0.19)( 0.26)( 5.52)
SIG3 All data 0.11 0.72 26.01 38.97
(0.03)( 0.07)( 5.17)( 2.00)
Last block 0.08 0.83 19.84 40.89
(0.08)( 0.12)( 5.44)( 0.96)
SCR2 All data 0.14 0.68 33.77 43.01
(0.05)( 0.03)( 2.88)( 1.39)
Last block 0.15 0.92 22.27 41.3
(0.10)( 0.05)( 4.92)( 2.18)
SCR3 All data 0.07 0.49 30.02 37.62
(0.00)( 0.20)( 3.59)( 7.96)
Last block 0.00 0.62 27.31 43.04
(0.00)( 0.26)( 6.24)( 4.08)
Notes. Averages of session averages of investment rates and wages paid. Standard errors of the mean in parentheses.
Predictions for the pooling equilibrium: no investment; wage = 30; for the separating equilibrium: only high type invests;
wage = 10 for low type, wage = 50 for high type. Last block consists of rounds 41–48 in SIG2a n dS CR2 and of rounds
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We run multi-level random intercept regressions using generalized linear latent and mixed
models (gllamm); see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005) or http://www.gllamm.org/. They take
account of the fact that “level-1” units (subjects) are nested in “level-2” units (sessions) and the
latter are nested in treatments.6 We run probit regressions for the investment choice and linear
regressions for the wages and proﬁts and test whether the coefﬁcient of the dummy is statistically
different from zero. We provide details of the regression speciﬁcations for each of the results
stated in Tables 2 and 5. For the regressions, we used decisions from all rounds.
There are four general results which hold across all treatments. After presenting them be-
low, we will discuss and differentiate these ﬁndings in Section 4.2. Finally, we will focus on
differences between treatments, reported in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Result 1. High types of workers invest signiﬁcantly more often than low types of workers.
Investment rates of high types are signiﬁcantly higher in all treatments at the 1% signiﬁcance
level (see Table 2). Low types’ investment rate is close to zero toward the end of the experi-
ment, as predicted. This demonstrates that different types tend to separate themselves by their
investment choice. The result is also apparent in Figs. 1 and 2. The left panel in Fig. 1 shows the
evolution of the average investment rates over time for high and low types, both for the signaling
game with two and three employers. The left panel in Fig. 2 contains investment decisions in the
Table 2
Details and results of statistical tests for Results 1-4
Treatment Estimates for the coefﬁcient β1. H0: β1 = 0
Result 1a Result 2a Result 3a Result 4a
Workers’ Wages Workers’ Employers’
investment paid payoffs proﬁts
SIG21 .822 (0.174) 13.269 (0.899) 6.930 (1.047) 8.398 (1.876)
SIG31 .950 (0.165) 13.481 (0.990) 6.613 (1.177) 10.462 (1.901)
SCR21 .800 (0.163) 10.781 (1.256) 9.995 (1.240) 11.465 (1.949)
SCR31 .669 (0.179) 12.344 (1.259) 6.988 (1.217) 10.973 (2.267)
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. We ran the following regressions separately for each treatment. For this purpose,
let i, j,a n dk be indices for measurement occasions, subjects and sessions, respectively. For Result 1, we model the





k +εijk where TYPE is equal to 1 if the worker was of high type and 0 otherwise, η
(2)
jk is the
random intercept for subject j in session k, η
(3)
k is the random intercept for session k,a n dεijk is a normally distributed
error term. The random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally distributed. For Result 2, the linear equation




k + εijk,w h e r eINVEST is
equal to 1 if the worker invested and 0 otherwise and all other variables are deﬁned as above. For Result 3, the linear




k +εijk, where all variables are deﬁned





k + εijk, where all variables are deﬁned as above. In all regressions, the estimate for β1 can be interpreted
as the difference in behavior between different types of the worker or employers receiving different signals. We use for
computing signiﬁcance levels P>|t|.
a Results 1 to 4 are signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all treatments.
6 Regressions that take each subject’s data as independent observations and ignore the dependence of observations
within a session (using subject clusters) yield nearly identical estimates for Results 1–4 and similar estimates for Re-
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Fig. 1. Evolution of investment rates and wages paid in treatments SIG2a n dS IG3.
two screening treatments. In all treatments, the investment rate of high types is always above the
investment rate of low types. Moreover, this effect becomes more pronounced over time as the
difference between the investment rates of high and low types signiﬁcantly increases over time7
(at the 1% level in SIG2, SCR2, and at the 5% level in SIG3, SCR3).8
Result 2. Wages offered and wages paid are signiﬁcantly higher for workers who invest than for
workers who do not invest.
Table 1 shows that average wages paid are higher for workers who invest in education than
for workers who do not invest. This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all four treatments (see Table
2). Test results for wages offered are the same as for wages paid and are therefore not reported.
In addition, the time trend is also in favor of the separating equilibrium (see again Figs. 1 and 2).
The wage spread signiﬁcantly increases over time in all treatments (at the 1% level). The same
signiﬁcant time trend holds for wages offered.
Result 3. High-type workers earn signiﬁcantly higher payoffs than low types.
For workers’ payoffs, refer to Table 3. In the pooling equilibrium both types earn the same
(30 points) as neither type invests. The separating equilibrium predicts that high types earn 41
points while low types earn 10 points. The table indicates that high types earn more than low
types and this result is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all four treatments. However, the spread
7 To test for these time effects, we simply looked at the correlation between the average difference of the investment
rates of high and low types and periods.
8 In the screening sessions, workers know the higher wage offer for each investment decision. Thus, they only have to
take the investment decision which maximizes their payoff. The data indicate a high proportion of payoff-maximizing
decisions (90% in SCR2 and 91% in SCR3). Moreover, the number of rational decisions is signiﬁcantly higher in the
second half of the experiment. Most irrational decisions (70 out of a total of 81) were taken in situations where a worker
should have invested but decided not to do so.D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236 227
Fig. 2. Evolution of investment rates and wages paid in treatments SCR2a n dS CR3.
Table 3
Average payoffs of workers and average net proﬁts of hiring employers
Treatment Rounds Workers’ payoff Hiring employers’ proﬁt after
if the type is employing a worker who did
low high not invest invest
SIG2 All data 11.47 18.17 .82 16.2
(2.34)( 2.07)( 1.66)( 2.06)
Last block 12.92 20.52 4.42 20.62
(0.31)( 3.27)( 3.78)( 5.52)
SIG3 All data 22.51 29.12 −5.54 5.98
(4.43)( 2.31)( 3.24)( 2.79)
Last block 18.39 29.73 −3.18 5.78
(6.07)( 2.71)( 7.09)( 2.76)
SCR2 All data 26.49 36.41 −11.57 1.48
(3.91)( 0.98)( 2.64)( 3.02)
Last block 18.74 32.37 −9.01 4.48
(6.08)( 1.98)( 3.35)( 3.15)
SCR3 All data 26.88 33.38 −6.33 6.63
(3.98)( 3.13)( 1.81)( 6.07)
Last block 25.50 37.49 −9.60 6.96
(5.20)( 3.86)( 4.70)( 4.08)
Notes. Averages of session averages of worker payoff and (hiring) employer proﬁt. Standard deviation of the mean in
parentheses. Predictions: in the pooling equilibrium both types earn 30; in the separating equilibrium high types earn 41,
low types earn 10; employers earn zero throughout. Last block consists of rounds 41–48 in SIG2a n dS CR2 and of rounds
43–48 in SIG3a n dS CR3.
between the wages paid to a worker who invested and a worker who did not invest is much lower
than predicted by the separating equilibrium (see Table 1). This is due to the fact that separation
of high and low types is incomplete. We will elaborate on this below.228 D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236
Turning to employers’ proﬁts we ﬁnd that
Result 4. Employers’ net proﬁts are signiﬁcantly higher when they employ a worker who has
invested than when employing a worker who has not invested.
Employers are predicted to compete in a Bertrand fashion, leading to zero expected proﬁts.
Table 3 indicates that, with the exception of treatment SIG2, hiring employers’ proﬁts are neg-
ative9 when employing an non-investing worker whereas they are positive when employing an
investing worker. Result 4 summarizes the last column of Table 2 which shows that the difference
in proﬁts is signiﬁcant. We elaborate on the possible reasons for this ﬁnding in the next section.
4.2. Separating versus pooling of types
The results of the previous section suggest that there is separating behavior in the data. In
all treatments, high and low types of workers clearly display different investment behavior, and
employers reward investing workers with higher wages. However, a number of observations are
not consistent with the separating equilibrium:
(A) Investment rates of high types of workers are below 100%, and it is fairly evident that sepa-
ration of high and low types is incomplete.
(B) We do not observe wages converging to the levels predicted by the separating equilibrium.
(C) Employers earn higher proﬁts when employing workers who invested than when employing
workers who have not invested which is neither in line with the separating equilibrium nor
with the pooling equilibrium.
To substantiate the claim that separation is incomplete, we identify “outcomes” deﬁned as
combinations of investment decisions and wage levels in the data. Table 4 provides information
onthedistributionoftheseoutcomesinthelastblockoftheexperiment.Wedeﬁneseparatingand
pooling outcomes here somewhat more broadly than the point predictions suggest. A separating
outcome requires that the low type does not invest and earns a payoff of less than 20, or that a
high-type worker invests and earns (weakly) more than 40 points. A pooling outcome occurs if
either the low or the high type does not invest and earns between 20 and 40 points. The category
“other” includes all outcomes that do not ﬁt into either the pooling or the separating category.10
Based on Table 4, we conduct some tests for differences between treatments below. But ﬁrst note
that between 46 and 61 percent of all observed outcomes are not separating, based on data from
the last block and given our rather lenient mode of classiﬁcation. In general, the observation of
separating behavior that does not fully converge to the separating equilibrium is consistent with
results of other signaling experiments (see Miller and Plott, 1985; Potters and van Winden, 1996;
Cooper et al., 1997b).
How can this ﬁnding be explained in our data set? Note ﬁrst that observations (A) and (B) are
mutually consistent. Given that some high types do not invest, a wage higher than the predicted
wage of 10 following no investment seems plausible. On the other hand, given that some low
9 Recall that employers received a ﬁxed payment of 25 in every period, but we report net earnings here.
10 The screening versions of the game do not have a pooling equilibrium. Nevertheless, we classify outcomes according
to the above scheme that includes pooling outcomes also for the screening data because this enables us to better compare
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Table 4
Percentages of outcomes in the last block (in all rounds)
Outcome SIG2S IG3S CR2S CR3
Separating 53 (42) 54 (38) 43 (37) 39 (41)
Pooling 4 (5) 18 (15) 25 (7) 50 (9)
Other 43 (53) 28 (47) 32 (56) 11 (50)
types invested early in the game (and a few even toward the end), it seems reasonable that many
employers offer less than the separating equilibrium wage of 50. In turn, high-type workers
sometimes experience that their investment does not pay which induces some of them to refrain
from investing. Thus, such path dependence can explain the persistence of high types who do not
always invest. By contrast, the investment never pays for a low type in our experiments, which
explains why the low types’ investment rates are close to the predicted level of zero in the last
periods of the experiment.
Let us turn to observation (C). Why do employers earn higher proﬁts when hiring investing
workers? First note that employer collusion cannot fully account for the higher employer proﬁts
when an investing worker is hired. Collusion should also raise proﬁts when the employer hires a
non-investing worker which is not what we observe. It is tempting to speculate that loss aversion
could explain our ﬁnding. A higher sensitivity to losses than to gains (as in prospect theory,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) implies that employers will bid relatively less for the worker who
invested (where the possible loss is larger, namely in the case that he turns out to be a low type)
than for the worker who has not invested. However, more research to substantiate this conjecture
is needed.
Finally, it seems warranted to comment on the observation that high-type workers frequently
make the costly investment. This is surprising as the wage premium paid to workers who invest
in the ﬁrst block does not cover the investment cost of 9 points (SIG2: 6.29; SIG3: 1.40; SCR2:
2.55) and is negative (−5.06) in treatment SCR3. If workers are assumed to be risk averse, this
investment behavior becomes even more puzzling. We are not able to offer a rational explanation
for this behavior. However, over time the wage spread increases (see the discussion of Result 2).
Employers seem to learn what the signal means. In the last block, investment of high types pays
off on average in all four treatments because wage spreads are considerably higher than the
investment cost (SIG2: 15.81; SIG3: 21.05; SCR2: 19.03; SCR3: 15.63).
4.3. Signaling versus screening
In this and the next subsection, we present the results regarding the treatment variables, that
is, the order of moves and the number of employers. Test results are shown in Table 5. We start
by comparing behavior in the signaling and the screening experiments. Fig. 3 shows the data of
the signaling and screening treatments with two employers while Fig. 4 shows the data with three
employers.
The ﬁrst result that can be taken from Fig. 3 is that investment rates in the signaling and
screening treatments are similar. There are no apparent differences with two employers. With
three employers, Fig. 4 suggests that there is a difference in investment behavior of high-type
workers. However, tests based on all rounds indicate that these differences are not signiﬁcant at
any conventional level.
A second ﬁnding is that, with two employers, workers’ wages are higher in the screening

























































Details and results of statistical tests for Results 5–8
Comparison Estimates for the coefﬁcient β1. H0: β1 = 0
(between) Workers Employers
Investment Payoffs Wages Paid Proﬁts
if worker’s type is for the case of
low high low high no invest invest no invest invest
SIG2a n dS IG3
−0.11 −0.48 −11.21*** −11.01*** −11.25*** −11.04*** 13.51*** 10.38***
(0.302)( 0.368)( 4.220)( 2.566)( 4.237)( 3.167)( 3.112)( 2.952)
SCR2a n dS CR3
0.35 0.55 −0.15 2.80 3.35 5.72 −5.36** −5.17
(0.374)( 0.566)( 4.619)( 2.572)( 3.639)( 6.557)( 2.587)( 5.062)
SIG2a n dS CR2
−0.18 −0.22 −15.18*** −18.26*** −18.80*** −15.32*** 19.32*** 14.94***
(0.435)( 0.248)( 3.904)( 1.840)( 2.253)( 2.950)( 2.429)( 2.739)
SIG3a n dS CR3
0.24 0.86 −4.18 −4.44 −3.98 1.26 0.34 −0.89
(0.247)( 0.676)( 4.882)( 3.134)( 5.106)( 6.637)( 3.215)( 5.302)
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. We conducted the comparisons between treatments separately for each worker type (Investment and Payoffs) or for each investment
decision (Wages and Proﬁts). In all regressions, the dummy variable TREATM is coded such that it is equal to 1 for the ﬁrst treatment mentioned in the ﬁrst column of this table
and it is equal to 0 for the second treatment in the ﬁrst column of this table. As above, let i, j,a n dk be indices for measurement occasions, subjects and sessions, respectively.




k + εijk,w h e r eTREATM is a
dummy used to code the treatments included in the regressions and all other variables are deﬁned as above (see Table 2). For Payoffs, the equation used for workers’ payoffs
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k +εijk. We report as p-levels P>|t|.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of investment rates and wages paid in treatments SIG2a n dS CR2.
Fig. 4. Evolution of investment rates and wages paid in treatments SIG3a n dS CR3.
with SCR2, the higher wages in SCR2 signiﬁcantly increase the payoff of investing workers and
signiﬁcantly decrease proﬁts of employers hiring investing or non-investing workers. Statistical
tests based on all rounds of the experiment (see Table 5) can be summarized as follows:
Result 5. (i) Investment behavior is the same with signaling and screening. This holds both with
two and three employers.
(ii) Comparing SIG2 and SCR2, we ﬁnd that screening signiﬁcantly increases wages paid
to both types of the worker, signiﬁcantly increases payoffs of both types of the worker, and
signiﬁcantly decreases proﬁts of employers hiring investing or non-investing workers.232 D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236
(iii) Comparing SIG3 and SCR3, we ﬁnd no statistical differences in wages paid to workers
or payoffs earned by workers and employers.
Itisnoteworthythat,despitesimilarinvestmentrates,wagesarehigherinthescreeninggames.
We can only speculate about the reasons for this ﬁnding. One possible explanation is that the
signaling game facilitates collusion among the employers compared to the screening game: In
the signaling game the employers’ strategy space has only one dimension whereas it has two
dimensions in the screening game. But this needs to be studied more thoroughly in future work.
Comparing outcomes (that is, combinations of wages and investment decisions) in the signal-
ing and the screening treatments in Table 4, we note an interesting effect. Screening reduces the
share of separating outcomes (53% in SIG2 vs. 43% in SCR2; 54% in SIG3 vs. 39% in SCR3)
and increases the share of pooling outcomes (4% in SIG2 vs. 25% in SCR2; 18% in SIG3v s .
50% in SCR3).11 If anything, we should have observed the opposite as the screening game has
a unique equilibrium which is separating. The data also show that screening reduces the number
of outcomes that are neither separating nor pooling. Chi-square tests reveal that the differences
in outcomes are signiﬁcant (SIG2v s .S CR2: χ2 = 17.86, d.f. = 2, p<0.001; SIG3v s .S CR3:
χ2 = 24.89, d.f. = 2, p<0.001). Summarizing we state
Result 6. Screening reduces the share of separating outcomes and increases the share of pooling
outcomes relative to signaling.
A closer look at the outcome data reveals that an important reason for this ﬁnding is the higher
wage level of low types in the screening sessions. This causes many non-investing low types to
be categorized as pooling rather than separating (both with two and with three employers). On
the other hand, screening leads to an increase of separating outcomes because there is a higher
share of high types who invest and get a wage above 40, but this effect is much smaller than the
increase in pooling of low types. Thus, the order of moves (SIG vs. SCR) has a decisive impact
on the proportion of pooling and separating outcomes through the competitiveness of the wage
game.
4.4. Two versus three employers
Finally, we analyze the effect of increased employer competition. Fig. 1 displays the evolu-
tion of investment behavior and wages paid in treatments SIG2 and SIG3. Regarding investment
decisions there is no signiﬁcant difference between the signaling treatments with two and three
employers (see Table 5). In the left panel of Fig. 1 (investments) there are no apparent differ-
ences but, as shown in the right panel of this ﬁgure, wages paid in treatment SIG3 are shifted
upward compared to SIG2. As a result, adding a third employer reduces employer proﬁts in the
signaling game (which is signiﬁcant for both worker types). This conﬁrms the results in Fouraker
and Siegel (1963) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). Note that wages after both investment
decisions increase. Thus, the incentive to invest remains almost unchanged, and consequently,
the wage increase has no effect on investment decisions.
Result 7 (SIG2 vs. SIG3). Increased employer competition:
11 These results do not depend on the selection of the last block. If instead all rounds of the second half of the experiment
are selected the qualitative results are unchanged.D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236 233
(i) does not signiﬁcantly change investment behavior,
(ii) signiﬁcantly increases wages paid to both worker types,
(iii) signiﬁcantly increases payoffs of both worker types,
(iv) signiﬁcantly decreases employer proﬁts both when hiring investing and non-investing
workers.
Now consider the screening sessions of the experiment and refer to Fig. 2, which shows the
evolution of investment behavior and wages paid in treatments SCR2 and SCR3. At ﬁrst sight,
addingathirdemployerappearstoincreasetheinvestmentrateofhightypes.However,thiseffect
is not signiﬁcant. It is noteworthy that employers who offer menus of wages (in the screening
games) instead of single wages (in the signaling games) compete as ﬁercely when there are
two competitors as when there are three. As mentioned before, implicit collusion among two
employers can be more difﬁcult to achieve when the strategy space has two dimensions.
Result 8 (SCR vs. SCR3). Increased employer competition has no signiﬁcant effect on workers’
investment behavior, wages paid and payoffs. There is a signiﬁcant increase in employer proﬁts
from hiring a non-investing worker due to increased competition.
From Table 4 it is apparent that pooling outcomes become more frequent with three instead
of two competitors in signaling games and that there is a decrease in “Other” outcomes. The
difference in the proportions of outcomes between treatments SIG2 and SIG3 is signiﬁcant
(χ2 = 12.09, d.f. = 2, p<0.01). A closer inspection of the outcome data reveals that almost
all separating outcomes in treatment SIG2 are due to low types separating (that is, not investing
and getting a wage less than 20). Increasing competition in the signaling game increases wages
for both investment decisions. The increase in wages paid after no investment in SIG3 implies
that many non-investing low types receive higher wages and are therefore categorized as pooling
and not as separating. The increase in wages paid after investment in SIG3 implies that many in-
vesting high types also receive higher wages which leads to an increase in separating outcomes.
In sum, the share of separating outcomes remains roughly the same. What we see though is a re-
duction in “Other” outcomes in Table 4. As in the signaling versions, adding a third employer in
the screening game increases the pooling outcomes and decreases outcomes labeled “Other.” The
proportions of outcomes differ signiﬁcantly between treatments SCR2 and SCR3( χ2 = 18.78,
d.f. = 2, p = 0.001).
Result 9. Moving from two to three employers, we observe an increase in the proportion of pool-
ing outcomes and a decrease of non-categorized behavior in both the signaling and the screening
treatments.
5. Summary and conclusion
We analyze and compare both a signaling and a screening variant of the Spence education
game, and investigate the effect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In
all four treatments of the experiment, we ﬁnd that the less efﬁcient workers only rarely choose
the costly investment while the efﬁcient types mostly do. Consistent with this ﬁnding, there is a
signiﬁcantwage spread,andworkerswhoinvestgetsigniﬁcantlyhigherwagesthanthosewhodo
not invest. However, the separation of types is not complete in our data, as in most other signaling
experiments.Wagesfor investingworkers are toolow and thosefor non-investingworkers are too234 D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236
high compared to the prediction. Moreover, employers earn higher proﬁts when hiring a worker
who invested than when hiring a worker who has not invested.
As in previous signaling experiments, path dependence is an important aspect of behavior as
the beliefs about other players are formed in the ﬁrst rounds of the experiment. Investment be-
havior does not signal a worker’s type perfectly and so the wage spread is smaller than predicted.
This can be explained with some noisy behavior at the beginning of each session which leads to
a persistent pattern of less than full separation.
The comparison of signaling and screening suggests that signaling and screening institutions
work similarly if there is enough competition between employers. With three employers, the
two institutions yield the same results with respect to wages and investment behavior (when
studying these two variables separately). Though signaling sessions with two employers are less
competitive in terms of wages than screening sessions with two employers, investment behavior
is the same. Thus, the size of the welfare loss due to wasteful investments is independent of the
order of moves and the competitiveness of the market.
When focusing on outcomes as combinations of wage levels and investment decisions, we
observe signiﬁcant differences between signaling and screening games. Most importantly, the
share of separating outcomes is larger with signaling than with screening. Screening leads to
more pooling although this is not an equilibrium of the screening game. We explain this obser-
vation by differences in wage setting of employers under signaling and screening institutions.
Thus, the order of moves affects the amount of separating outcomes through the difference in the
competitiveness of the market.
Increasing the number of ﬁrms from two to three only affects the results in the signaling
treatments where we observe an increase in wages but no change in investment rates. Increased
employer competitionhas no effect in the screening treatments.This is due to the fact that screen-
ing with two employers is already quite competitive such that the addition of a third employer
does not change the results.
For future research it could be useful to elicit the beliefs of players in order to pin down the
equilibrium more precisely.
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Appendix A. Instructions for treatment SIG2
Please read these instructions closely! Please do not talk to your neighbors and remain quiet during the whole exper-
iment. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you to answer it.
In this experiment you can earn varying amounts of money, depending on which decisions you and other participants
make. Your earnings in the experiment are denoted by points. In the beginning of the experiment, every participant
receives 200 points as an initial endowment. Your total payoff at the end of the experiment is equal to the sum of your
own payoffs in each round plus your initial endowment. For every 150 points you will be paid £1.D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236 235
A.1. Description of the experiment
In the experiment, three participants interact with each other: one participant in the role of an employee and two
participants in the role of employers. The employee can be of “type 1” or of “type 2.” The experiment consists of several
rounds, and at the beginning of each round, a random draw determines the employee’s type. The random draw is such that
both possible types of employee (“type 1” or “type 2” ) are equally probable to be drawn (50:50). After the random draw,
the employee is informed about his/her type. However, the employers are not informed about the type of the employee.
Knowing his or her type, the employee has to decide whether or not he/she wants to make an investment. The costs
of the investment depend on the employee’s type: The investment cost of an employee of type 1 is 9 points and the
investment cost of an employee of type 2 is 45 points. After the employee’s investment decision, the employers are
informed about whether the employee has made an investment or not. Knowing the investment decision of the employee,
the two employers simultaneously decide which wage they want to offer the employee. They can choose a wage between
0 and 60 points (if desired, up to two decimal places).
Given the two wage offers of the employers, the employee is hired by the employer who offered the higher wage. (If
both employers make the same wage offer, the computer decides randomly and with equal probability which of the two
employers hires the employee.)
It is important to understand that the proﬁt of the employer who hires the employee depends both on the wage offered
and on the employee’s type, but not on the investment decision. This is explained in the following section.
A.2. Payoffs
The payoff of the employee at the end of each round is given as follows:
• If the employee has not invested, he/she is paid the higher wage offer, independently of his/her type.
• If the employee has invested, his/her payoff depends on the type:
– If the employee is of type 1, his/her payoff is: higher wage offer minus 9 points.
– If the employee is of type 2, his/her payoff is: higher wage offer minus 45 points.
The payoff of the employer, who hired the employee, depends on the employee’s type:
• If the hired employee is of type 1, the employer’s payoff is: 50 points minus wage offer.
• If the hired employee is of type 2, the employer’s payoff is: 10 points minus wage offer.
In addition, both employers (that is, also the employer who did not hire an employee) receive a payoff of 25 points in
every round.
Please note that the employer who has hired the employee makes losses if the wage offer is greater than 50 and the
employee is of type 1 or if the wage offer is greater than 10 and the employee is of type 2.
Please note also that the employee makes losses if the cost of investment (in case an investment has been made) is
higher than both wage offers. That is, an employee of type 1 makes losses if he/she invests and the higher wage offer is
below 9 points, and an employee of type 2 makes losses if he/she invests and the higher wage offer is below 45 points.
To give you a clearer sense of the rules, the timing of events can be summarized as follows:
1. The computer randomly determines the employee’s type. With a 50% probability the employee is either of type 1 or
of type 2. After the random draw, the employee is informed about his/her type, but the employers are not informed
about it.
2. The two employers simultaneously decide on their individual wage offer (a number from the interval of 0 to 60).
3. The employee is automatically hired by the employer who made the higher wage offer. If both employers make the
same wage offer, a random draw (50:50) decides which employer hires the employee.
4. The payoffs are given as described above.
A.3. Number of rounds and role assignment
The experiment consists of 48 rounds.236 D. Kübler et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 64 (2008) 219–236
You will have to make decisions both as the employer and as the employee, alternating in the following way: The
roles of all participants are randomly determined for 8 consecutive rounds. After 8 rounds new roles are assigned to all
participants that remain in place for another 8 rounds. For example, a participant who had the role of the employee for
the past 8 rounds, will have the role of the employer for the next 16 rounds (if the experiment is not over before this).
Your computer screen shows you in every round which role you have in that round. At the end of each round, you are
informed about the employee’s type, the wage offers, and the payoffs of all three participants.
Please notice that in every round the groups of 3 players are randomly matched from the pool of all participants. We
secure that it is always one employee and 2 employers who form one group.
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